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In order to address some existing difﬁ  culties in corporate income taxation (CIT), 
the European Commission proposed the introduction of measures for coordina-
tion, a solution contested by some member states but supported by most professio-
nals and many organizations representing the interests of European employers. 
Disputes in connection with the introduction of the Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base (CCCTB) are occasioned by the uncertainty regarding its effects. 
Since CIT makes an important contribution to the forming of central budget reve-
nues, the CCCTB is a challenge for Romanian public authorities. The Romanian 
government has not made clear its options in this respect. In this paper we present 
the main points of view about the implications of introducing the CCCTB as seen 
by specialists and estimate the effects of the EU formula apportionment on CIT 
revenues in Romania. 
According to research results on a sample of companies in 2006-09, Romania will 
assume a loser position if the EU formula apportionment uses the payroll (altho-
ugh the loss of tax revenue would be lower than other researchers have estimated) 
and a winner position if the EU formula apportionment does not use the payroll.
Keywords: coordination, corporate, consolidation, taxation, EU formula appor-
tionment, tax revenues
1 INTRODUCTION
In accordance with the European Union Treaty, member states have a full auto-
nomy in direct taxation, including CIT. This autonomy may be limited only if 
domestic taxes are not compatible with EU law. In principle, national tax legisla-
tion should not create obstacles to cross-border economic transactions. In fact, the 
existence of 27 CIT national systems is a signiﬁ  cant obstacle to the proper func-
tioning of the Single Market. The main difﬁ  culties generated from the lack of 
common rules on corporate taxation inhere in the costs of knowing the tax legisla-
tion in each member state, monitoring the transfer pricing, the risk of double taxa-
tion, the general inability to offset losses in one member state by revenues in 
another state and the possibility of transferring the tax base from countries with 
high tax to countries with low tax levels.
In this context, efforts have been made to ensure the better coordination of inter-
national corporate taxation. In order to solve the existing CIT problems, the Euro-
pean Commission proposed the introduction of measures for coordination, a solu-
tion contested by some member states but supported by most specialists, many 
organizations representing the interests of employers and public authorities in 
countries affected by the migration of capital located in their territory under the 
inﬂ  uence of tax competition manifested in the European Union. No decision re-
garding the setting of the framework for coordination of CIT has yet been made, 






































































































































































































199 The CCCTB system is an ambitious goal of the European Commission. Technical 
discussions related to this system were launched in September 2004, when a 
working group was formed to help the Commission prepare a legislative proposal 
in this regard. The common tax base involves establishing a single tax base for the 
activities of a transnational company, while consolidation means that the income, 
the expenditure, and the taxable proﬁ  ts will be calculated in one state (that in which 
the parent company is located), then the tax will be collected in that state and
afterwards distributed to the other states in which the company has its activities.
Our research started with the question “In which camp will Romania be after the 
introduction of the CCCTB: that of the winners or that of the losers in tax reve-
nues?” The need to ﬁ  nd an answer to this question was determined by the low 
number of European studies on the tax harmonization issue in which Romania is 
included (due to the relatively recent accession of Romania to the European 
Union).
Representatives of the Romanian Government have so far expressed no pro opi-
nions or views against the European Commission proposal, because no assess-
ment of the impact of the introduction of CCCTB at a national level has been 
made. The main objective of this paper is to suggest the impact of using the EU 
formula for apportionment on CIT revenue in Romania. For this purpose a repre-
sentative sample of companies was made and the necessary data were collected 
for determining EU formula apportionment components from consolidated ﬁ  nan-
cial statements and balance sheets. After processing the data we determined the 
level of CIT in the sample, at two moments: (1) the existing situation characteri-
zed by lack of consolidation and distribution rules, and (2) after the consolidated 
tax base assignation. Because the analysis focused on a period of four years (2006-
09), we avoided getting results inﬂ  uenced by incidental factors.
The ﬁ  rst two parts of the work aim to familiarize the reader with issues relating to 
CCCTB, and the last parts represent our contribution to the enrichment of litera-
ture.
2 MAIN ISSUES IN THE COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE
2.1 ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
A common tax base involves establishing a single tax base for activities of a tran-
snational company, and consolidation means that the income, the expenditure, and 
the taxable proﬁ  ts will be calculated in one state (–the home state of the parent 
company), then the tax will be collected in that state and afterwards distributed to 
other states in which the company has its activities. The expected beneﬁ  ts of in-
troducing this model are many (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001):
• the signiﬁ  cant reduction of compliance costs;
• the disappearance of the double taxation problem within the EU;
2 MAIN ISSUES IN THE COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE






































































































































































































200 •   the removing of a major obstacle to the free movement of capital and unre-
stricted exercise of the right of establishment, by cross-border loss compensation 
of tax losses by reducing the taxable proﬁ  ts of parent companies (but only within 
the European Union);
•   the disappearance of the tax avoidance practices by using “transfer pricing”, 
because intra-ﬁ  rm transaction prices can not affect the distribution of taxable 
income to tax jurisdictions;
•   the comparability of effective tax burdens in each jurisdiction (in terms of a 
single base, the nominal rates are perfectly comparable), with the consequence 
of an improvement in the quality of investment and hence of resource allocation 
to the whole EU.
The advantages of the CCCTB could create the preconditions for achieving im-
portant goals of EU ﬁ  scal policy:
•   supporting the success and the common market development by allowing all 
member states to compete fairly and to take advantage of the internal market;
•   sustainable reduction of the overall tax burden in the European Union, by ensu-
ring a balance between tax reductions, investment in public services and sustai-
ning ﬁ  scal consolidation.
On the other hand, we must not neglect the negative aspects that come with 
CCCTB:
•   increasing the complexity of tasks of workers in the government tax service and 
the creation of new jobs, i.e. hiring of additional labour in public ﬁ  nances, since 
the introduction of the CCCTB implies a new system, besides the 27 national 
systems that exist currently in the European Union;
•   achieving ﬁ  scal control will cause difﬁ  culties because the tax authorities of 
member states need to cooperate and coordinate their activities very well;
•   implementation of the CCCTB does not preclude the possibility that there will 
be an increase in tax competition, because to attract foreign investment, national 
authorities will continue to use a tax rate reduction as a tax incentive.
2.2 THE EUROPEAN UNION FORMULA APPORTIONMENT
Legislation on the CCCTB will apply to companies paying tax in the EU member 
states (these will be speciﬁ  ed in an annex to the regulation that will be amended 
annually) organized in groups, but operating according to individual economic 
strategies. Corporations resident in the European Union countries may choose to 
employ the CCCTB. The conditions for creating a corporate group for application 
of the CCCTB relate to equity (the parent company has to hold at least 75% of the 
equity of subsidiaries), control (the parent company must have at least 50% of 
voting rights (at the general meetings of shareholders of controlled companies) 
and the right to repatriate (at least 75% of the proﬁ  ts made      by subsidiaries are 






































































































































































































201 In order to allocate the consolidated tax base among member states entitled to levy 
taxes on corporate income, the working group for designing the CCCTB proposed 
a sharing mechanism, easy to implement and to verify for both taxpayers and tax 
administrations, fair and equitable for all member states and not likely to generate 
undesirable effects in terms of tax competition. 
In late 2007 the working group for the design of the CCCTB system published a 
document with the Commission’s proposal on the mechanism for allocating the 
consolidated tax base among entitled member states. The document states that the 
working group tried to create an allocating mechanism easy to implement and to 
check both for taxpayers and tax administrations. The working group proposed a 
fair and equitable mechanism for allocating to all members in order to avoid un-
desirable effects in terms of tax competition. To avoid the manipulation of the 
system by taxpayers, the working group focused on the factors that cannot be ar-
tiﬁ  cially transferred between different tax jurisdictions (European Commission, 
2007b).
The formula for allocating the tax base for branch A (EU formula apportionment), 
as shown in the Working Group document, is the following:
Tax Base A
To avoid manipulation of the system by taxpayers, the working group turned to 
factors that cannot be artiﬁ  cially transferred between different tax jurisdictions: 
the assets, the workforce and the turnover. 
Using the characteristic factors of individual companies allows for correlation 
between the real economic activity of a particular company and the consolidated 
tax base distributed to the member state in which that activity took place. The 
accurate reﬂ  ection of the consolidated tax base depends, however, on how the 
information on the EU formula apportionment factors is collected. In addition, 
any chosen allocation key will affect in a certain way the incentives for taxpayers 
and therefore there is a risk of manipulation by the authorities. Speciﬁ  cally, they 
can reduce the un-harmonized taxes to maximize the level of a certain factor in its 
own jurisdiction: for example, if the number of employees is used as a criterion, 
by reducing social security contributions it can stimulate employment. This could 
reach a situation where even if the activity of a group is proﬁ  table as a whole, 






































































































































































































202 its share of a consolidated tax base. For example, the choice of home sales will be 
an incentive to locate investments in jurisdictions with lower tax rates. Choosing 
the destination of sales will stimulate the consumption and imports and will di-
scourage the exports (Negrescu at al., 2007). 
Calculations for the taxable distribution will be made annually. A positive conso-
lidated tax base (net proﬁ  t) will be allocated immediately, and a negative consoli-
dated tax base (net loss) will be compensated for in the future with the group 
earnings. When a company leaves a group of companies that opted for strengthe-
ning the tax base or when a company joins a group that has opted for strengthe-
ning the tax base, the strengthening of the tax base and its distribution will be 
made for that fraction of the tax period in which the company was a member of 
the group (European Commission, 2007a).
The problem for which at present no convenient solution has been found relates to 
the accounting rules to be used to deﬁ  ne the common base. Discussions at the le-
vel of the working group frequently targeted the idea of using International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS). They have the advantage, in addition to their 
wide international recognition, of easy adaptation to taxpayers, because – with 
effect from January 1, 2005 – at Community level a Regulation is applied requi-
ring listed companies on regulated capital markets to prepare their consolidated 
balance sheets under International Financial Reporting Standards requirements.
2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW
The introduction of some measures to coordinate the CIT in the EU member coun-
tries is likely to have positive effects on some of those states, but also to affect 
others adversely. Results of testing performed in 2004 in order to evaluate the 
effects of the CIT coordination in the EU (Nielsen et al., 2004) pointed out the 
following aspects:
•   a total harmonization based on CIT rules determined through a weighted average 
of GDP of member states will generate the greatest beneﬁ  ts at the EU level (an 
increase of GDP across the EU about 4%), increasing the welfare of people 
throughout the Union by 0.1%, while maintaining the same level of tax reve-
nues);
•   whatever the scenario applied, some member states will record losses of tax re-
venues from CIT harmonization, so that a compensation mechanism will be ne-
cessary. 
On the other hand, states capable to obtain higher tax revenue (due to higher tax 
rate and/or tax base) will record a loss of GDP due to distortions occurring in the 
business, so the compensation mechanism has little chance of implementation.
Scenarios were tested using the CETAX model developed by Peter Birch Søren-
sen that is simulates the international side effects of national ﬁ  scal policies, with 






































































































































































































203 In 2006, a number of specialists (Brøchner et al., 2007) said that EU-wide the ne-
cessary consensus for a major reform in the CIT system (the introduction of har-
monized rules) will not be achieved, because the CIT harmonization will generate 
antagonistic effects for individual member states, while the scale of changes in 
GDP (around 5 percentage points), the welfare level (about 0.8 percentage points) 
and tax revenue (about 2 percentage points) will be quite broad. Instead, strengthe-
ned coordination between a number of countries that are relatively homogeneous 
(in terms of economic development level, tax rates and rules for determining the 
tax base) in the CIT was held to be a viable solution. Such an approach will lead to 
less radical policy changes but smaller gains from harmonization. Conclusions of 
the study made     by Jeans Brøchner, Jesper Jensen, Patrik Svensson and Peter Birch 
Sørensen have proved correct. In 2006-08, the representatives of some member 
countries (UK, Ireland, Poland, Latvia) came out against total CIT harmonization 
and also against the introduction of the CCCTB. Some of those politicians claimed 
the need to maintain national sovereignty in taxation and others have complained 
about the tax losses will be recorded. Since the unanimous support of member 
states for CIT harmonization is unlikely to be achieved, the European Commission 
decided that the proposal for a Directive which will introduce the CCCTB could be 
the subject of enhanced cooperation between member states, provided that there 
are at least eight participating countries (DG ECOFIN, 2008).
Estimates regarding the effects of CIT harmonization achieved through the
CETAX model (described above) does not include the effects of tax base consoli-
dation and its distribution among member states entitled to levy taxes, but only the 
effects of introducing a single tax on corporate income and/or some common rules 
for determining the EU tax base.
The effects of the introduction of coordinating rules of the CIT systems were si-
mulated using the CETAX model in 2007 by Albert van der Horst, Leon Betten-
dorf and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa, who included in their model data about 17 mem-
ber states and the US. Testing several hypotheses regarding the CIT coordination 
in the European Union (where common corporate tax system adoption was optio-
nal or mandatory, the introduction of a single corporate tax rate or the mainten-
ance of national tax rates) and considering the distribution of consolidated tax 
base according to a formula with three factors (capital, production and employ-
ment), the three authors reached several conclusions, including the following: sta-
tes with an initial narrow tax base (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece) will register an 
increase in revenue tax and vice versa.
The model for analyzing the impact of the CIT coordination in the European 
Union did not include the effect of strengthening the tax base, and the calculations 
were based on a series of indicators with unrealistic values: compliance costs 
equal with 10% of payments for tax proﬁ  t, transfer pricing completely eliminated, 






































































































































































































204 ber states. Even if it has certain limitations, the study by Albert van der Horst, 
Leon Bettendorf and Hugo Rojas-Romagosa represents an important step in exa-
mining, in dynamic terms, the economic effects of the CIT coordination in the 
European Union.
2010 saw a further simulation based on the CORTEX model, which generated 
new results related to changes in national tax systems (Bettendorf et al., 2010). In 
a ﬁ  rst stage, the simulation analyzed the implications of introducing common ru-
les for determining the tax base for all companies (domestic or foreign owned) 
operating in the territory of the member states. Strengthening the tax base across 
the EU will create a reduction in CIT revenues of about 0.1% of GDP due to off-
setting the revenue and losses for companies with cross-border activities. This re-
duction will have greater amplitude for countries with a high CIT rate (i.e. Malta) 
or for countries where the corporate segment has a high importance (i.e. Belgium). 
Romania may assume a loser position with a reduction of about 0.5% of GDP in 
ﬁ  scal revenues.
Other studies (Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb, 2006; Devereux and Loretz, 2007, 
2008) have estimated the impact of the use of the EU formula apportionment on 
CIT revenues. 
The ﬁ  rst study, assessing the impact of the introduction and distribution rules to 
strengthen the tax base for corporations in the European Union, was made by 
Fuest, Hemmelgarn and Ramb (2006). In the absence of a comprehensive databa-
se with information on companies in all EU member states, the authors focused on 
the work undertaken by parent companies in Germany and their subsidiaries 
abroad between 1996 and 2001. The particular conditions of the analysis of the 
three German authors generated the following results (Fuest et al., 2006):
•   enhancing and sharing the corporate income tax base will generate losses of tax 
revenue for small states using tax incentives, because the incentivising tax bases 
in these countries are high compared with the real economic activity taking
place on their territory (measured by assets, turnover and wage fund);
•   compensation for loss of income in cross-border activities will generate a signi-
ﬁ  cant decrease in the total tax base. In the case of the analysis for 1,844 parent 
companies in Germany and 5,827 foreign subsidiaries, reduction of the total tax 
base was estimated at 20%.
Starting from the premise that the companies with cross-border activity will not 
change their location choices by the introduction of rules to harmonize CIT in the 
European Union, Devereux and Loretz (2007) estimated the effects of the EU 
apportionment formula on CIT revenues in the 22 member states. They made a 
comprehensive analysis (for all member states) because the database used did not 
contain the information on the number of employees and payroll for companies in 






































































































































































































205 The study was based on ﬁ  nancial results provided by some 400,000 companies 
that had assets worth at least 2 million and carried on business within the 25 states 
in 2000-2004.
In addition, Devereux and Loretz (2007) considered the possibility that some of the 
companies included in the database might refuse participation in the CCCTB, in 
view of its optional character. The authors concluded that consolidation and distri-
bution of the tax base would generate a loss of tax revenues across the EU because 
CIT revenues would fall by 2.4% due to cross-border offsetting of losses in proﬁ  ts. 
Most new member states will register growth of CIT revenues, while the majority 
of Northern and Western Europe will face a reduction of these revenues.
In 2008, Devereux and Loretz expanded the analysis on the impact of CIT coordi-
nation focusing on the effects of business efﬁ  ciency. Observations made of a 
group of 4,567 companies (323,442 companies) in 27 member states in 2001-05 
allowed the measurement of the change in the ratio of income taxes paid and the 
value of corporate proﬁ  ts before tax in: (a) the current situation, (b) the case of 
voluntary consolidation, and (c) the case of strengthening and sharing tax base. 
When there are different national tax systems (the current situation), the tax bur-
dens of companies examined in 2001-05 showed signiﬁ  cant differences among 
member states of the European Union (from 40.1% in Malta to 20.9% in Bel-
gium). The introduction of some optional consolidation rules on losses and inco-
me from cross-border activities will considerably diminish these differences (from 
29.9% in Malta to 18.3% in Italy). And more favorable results in terms of redu-
cing the tax burden were obtained in the strengthening and sharing tax base situa-
tion (from 28.6% to 19.7%). Also, the spread between countries is reduced signi-
ﬁ  cantly (from 21.6% in Cyprus to 18% in Italy), by creating the prerequisites to 
ensure a tax neutral conditions throughout the European Union. The average ef-
fective CIT rate in Romania will be reduced by about 7 percentage points should 
there be tax base consolidation and distribution, estimated thus a reduction in tax 
revenue collections (Devereux and Loretz, 2008).
The research results listed above only partially reﬂ  ect the impact of the CCCTB 
introduction because the models used do not include all the technical elements of 
the system.
3 SHORT ANALYSIS OF TRENDS AND MAJOR CHANGES 
The taxable corporate income is calculated as the difference between the income 
from any source and expenses incurred in order to achieve the revenue minus non-
taxable income plus non-deductible expenses. In calculating the taxable corporate 
income, authorities granted the following tax incentives:
a)   additional deduction of R&D expenditures of up to 20% of taxable income;
b)    the method of accelerated depreciation for equipment and equipment for 






































































































































































































206 Proﬁ  t reinvested in production and/or purchase of equipment (machinery and 
equipment work) is tax exempt.
Since 2005, the income tax rate has been 16% and is applied to taxable corporate 
income. The CIT revenues are collected by the central administration. Revenues 
from income tax in recent years registered an upward trend, representing over 
20% of the tax revenue of the central budget (see ﬁ  gure 1).
FIGURE 1
Evolution of the CIT revenue in Romania (thousands lei)
The introduction of a minimum income tax in May 2009 was a transitional mea-
sure regarding CIT. It applies to businesses whose tax was below the level for 
certain intervals depending on the total income in the previous ﬁ  scal year. So, for 
a company with total income of about 10,000 euro, the minimum income tax was 
about 500 euro, and for a company with total income exceeding 30 million euro, 
the minimum income tax was around 10,000 euro. Because even companies that 
temporarily have no work are obliged to pay the minimum income tax, since its 
introduction, thousands of companies have suspended their operations and CIT 
revenue decreased in 2009 compared to 2008. Also, the number of newly esta-
blished companies decreased considerably, small entrepreneurs preferring to con-
duct economic activities as authorized individuals (thus paying income tax with a 
rate of 16%). In this context, representatives of the Romanian Government repea-
led the minimum income tax in September 2010.
4 EFFECT OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION COORDINATION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ON TAX REVENUE IN ROMANIA
4.1 METHODOLOGY
In order to evaluate the effect of the CIT coordination in the European Union on 
tax revenue in Romania, we analyzed the existing situation in September of 2008 
for 9 corporations (Carrefour, E.ON AG, France Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, 
OMV Aktiengesellschaft, Peugeot SA, Saint-Gobain, Siemens, Unilever N.V.) 
and all their subsidiaries active in Romania (37 subsidiaries). These subsidiaries 















































































































































































































207 are representative of non-ﬁ  nancial companies with a foreign stake in capital in 
Romania in terms of the ﬁ  elds: industry, mining and processing, distribution and 
telecommunications. We believe that the chosen sample can provide correct resu-
lts regarding the impact of using the EU formula apportionment because the sub-
scribed capital of the companies that are part of our sample is 7-13% of the total 
subscribed capital of ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial companies with foreign stake in 
capital in Romania (see table 1). 
TABLE 1
The subscribed capital of companies (bill. euro)
2006 2007 2008 2009
The subscribed capital of companies that are part 
of our sample
  2.0   2.1   2.0   1.8
The subscribed capital of companies with foreign 
stake in capital in Romania
15.3 17.7 21.7 25.2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Statistics, National Trade Register Office of Romania and 
Database on Businesses and Public Institutions (Identification Data, Tax Information, Balances), 
Ministry of Public Finance of Romania.
This percentage was determined by sharing the amount of invested capital (ex-
pressed in euro at current exchange rates) entered in the annual balance sheets 
submitted to the National Trade Register Ofﬁ  ce by ﬁ  rms in the sample to the total 
value of subscribed capital of companies with foreign equity stake in Romania 
(National Trade Register Ofﬁ  ce of Romania, 2006-09). The decrease in the sub-
scribed capital of companies that are part of our sample in 2006-09 was generated, 
in large part, by a signiﬁ  cant devaluation of the leu (the Romanian national cur-
rency) against the euro (about 20%).
Of the companies sampled there are: Carrefour Romania SA (the retail company 
ranked in the top three retail companies in Romania), Petrom SA (the biggest 
company in Romania in terms of turnover – a member of the group OMV Aktien-
gesellschaft of Austria) and Orange Romania SA (the most proﬁ  table company in 
Romania). Information about the assets, the number of employees, the turnover, 
the taxable gross income and the CIT was obtained by consulting the consolidated 
ﬁ  nancial statements of companies and the accounting balance of branches, in 
2006-09 (annex 1).
Since the application of minimum tax on proﬁ  t (ﬁ  rms with a tax loss in 2009 paid 
income tax according to the total revenue obtained in 2008) would create distor-
tions in results, calculations were made by applying the rate of 16% to the ﬁ  scal 
base of 2009.
To obtain the necessarily processed information we designed an information sy-






































































































































































































208 in the CIT and an apparent situation based on the distribution of the consolidated tax 
base. An information system can be deﬁ  ned as a set of interrelated elements or 
components that collect (input), manipulate and store (process), and disseminate 
(output) data and information as well as a feedback mechanism. Our software can 
be considered a management information system, characterized by the use of infor-
mation systems to produce reports that help managers to perform their duties. The 
information system has been practically implemented in the Microsoft Access envi-
ronment and it is easy to use, thanks to a friendly graphic interface.
The focal point of the research was to determine the tax paid by sample companies 
in the existing situation and the tax that they would have to pay if the tax base 
were consolidated and divided. To determine the divided tax base of the sample 
branches, we used the formula agreed by the European Commission. Because we 
had no access to information about the payroll (companies are not obliged to di-
sclose this information), we considered two variants: 
1)   we estimated the value of this indicator taking into account the level of the 
average gross annual wage in Romania (3,713 euro in 2006; 4,825 euro in 
2007; 4,992 euro in 2008; and 5,464 euro in 2009) and in the European Union 
(31,302 euro in 2006), according the Eurostat data and the studies and press 
releases of the Romanian Government. Ofﬁ  cial statistical information on the 
average gross annual wage in the European Union covers only 2006, so for the 
coming years we indexed this value with annual inﬂ  ation rate in the European 
Union, published by Eurostat (2.2% in 2007, 2.3% in 2008 and 1% in 2009);
2)   we removed the payroll factor from the EU formula apportionment, giving an 
equal weight (1/3) of assets, turnover and number of employees.
4.2 DATA
In assessing the position held by companies of the sample within the group we 
present the following information.
TABLE 2
Information about the Romanian branches (%)
Year Assets of Romanian 
branches in total 
corporate assets
Turnover of Romanian 
branches in total 
corporate turnover
Employees of 
Romanian branches in 
total corporate 
employees
2006 1.37 1.35 3.00
2007 1.65 1.38 2.66
2008 1.70 1.80 2.40
2009 1.69 1.27 2.60






































































































































































































209 The CIT revenues from the 37 Romanian subsidiaries included in the sample
(according to annual balance sheets) have had a tendency to decrease, from 734.2 
million lei (208.3 million euro) in 2006 to 701 million lei (165.43 million euro) in 
2009 (see ﬁ  gure 2). 
FIGURE 2
Evolution of the CIT and taxable income for the Romanian branches sampled 
(thousands lei)
 Income corporate tax     Taxable income







In 2008, the income tax by branches of the Romanian companies decreased from 
2007, due to construction demand reduction (for example, two subsidiaries of 
Saint-Gobain Group recorded ﬁ  scal losses). Also, E.ON Gaz Distributie SA com-
pany (the largest subsidiary of E.ON AG group) recorded a ﬁ  scal loss due to hi-
gher costs for re-technologization. In 2009, as a result of the economic crisis, the 
number of branches with ﬁ  scal losses increased (see diminishing tax base) but this 
situation has not affected the CIT revenue because companies have paid the mini-
mum tax on proﬁ  ts.
We should mention that the amount of income tax paid by branches of the Roma-
nian companies represented 6-9% of the CIT revenue collected in the central
budget in 2006-09.
4.3 RESULTS
Application of the EU apportionment formula for each group of companies, in 
variant 1) and 2) generated a series of changes in the average CIT revenue in Ro-
mania (see table 3).
Using the two options for determining the CIT revenue we obtained different re-
sults. If the formula included payroll (in the form approved by the European Com-
mission), the CIT revenue in Romania would register a decline of 0.035% and the 
elimination of the payroll would generate an increase of these revenues by 32.6%. 






































































































































































































210 European Union, Romania would fall into the winners in the context of the intro-
duction of CCCTB.
TABLE 3





The average level of 
CIT revenue before 




The variation of the average level of 
CIT revenue by applying the EU 
formula apportionment (%)
variant 1 variant 2
Carrefour 4.6 -35.9 -19.6
E.ON AG  2.4 857.3 1,475.9
France Telecom  69.5 -76.8 -73.7




Peugeot SA  0.5 -88.8 -83.6
Saint-Gobain 1.6 90.4 109.6
Siemens 0.8 27.3 79.0
Unilever N.V.  1.2 148.7 184.8
Total sample 179.0 -0.03 32.6
5 CONCLUSIONS
Applying the EU apportionment formula generates signiﬁ  cant variations in the 
average level of CIT revenue from the most subsidiaries in Romania. This is due 
to the importance, lesser or greater, of subsidiaries in Romania in the group of 
companies, in terms of assets, sales and employment.
Compared with the study by Devereux and Loretz (2008), we identiﬁ  ed a more 
favourable position of Romania in terms of the effects of introducing CCCTB on 
tax revenue.
The most important limit of this research comes from the fact that the size of the 
sample is small, so our results can be interpreted only in this context. Also, the 
absence of actual data on payroll can affect the accuracy of results. For example, 
the average gross annual wage in Petrom SA (the largest subsidiary of OMV Ak-






































































































































































































211 (used in our calculations), because employees have a number of bonuses for work 
in conditions hazardous for health. Change with + / -1% of the average gross an-
nual wage used in our calculations for subsidiaries in Romania generated a change 
in the average CIT revenue by +0.04, respectively -0.06 percentage points. A 
change of + / -1% of average gross annual wage used in our calculations for cor-
porations generated a change in the average CIT revenue by -0.06, respectively 
+0.02 percentage points. The sensitivity of results to changes in payroll factor is 
not great, but this may bring about a change of Romania’s position regarding the 
impact of the EU formula apportionment on tax revenues: whether it is in the loser 
or the winner category.
However, an accurate assessment of implications of the CCCTB on tax revenues 
cannot be made because we cannot determine which groups of companies in the 
EU will choose to use this system. In the future, we plan to extend this research by 
introducing a larger number of companies into the sample.
However, given the recent discussions between representatives of member states 
on measures needed to increase the competitiveness of the European Union, 
among which we ﬁ  nd the expanding tax coordination in the ﬁ  eld of CIT, our re-
search can provide a scientiﬁ  c basis for Romania’s representatives in support for 
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